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This paper has both substantive and methodological concerns: 
Substantively, it is concerned with changes in the treatment of the concept 
"enlightenment" over the course of the nineteenth century. Its goal is to track the 
transmission, translation, and appropriation of German discussions on the nature, ends, 
and implications of Aufklärung into English. Its particular focus lies with the way in 
which a group of pejoratives associated with the concept in these German discussions 
(e.g., "falsche Aufklärung," "flache Aufklärung," "Aufklärerei") made their way into 
English and how, over the course of the nineteenth century, they were gradually 
abandoned. The result was the emergence, around 1910, of an understanding of "the 
Enlightenment" as a distinct historical period. 
Methodologically, it is interested in exploring some of the ways in which recently 
developed text analysis and visualization programs (specifically, nGrams and 
Bookworm) can aid in tracking the movement of terms over time, across languages 
(German to English), and across disciplines.  
It will argue that, in addition to their ability to survey a large corpus of texts far more 
readily than previously possible, such programs open up lines of inquiry that require 
historians of concepts to focus on the particular rhetorical force of certain modifiers (in 
this case, pejorative adjectives) that come to be associated with certain concepts but 
which, over time, can also become detached from them. The ability to track the 
movement of such terms prompts reflection on the advisability of attempting to enforce 
an overly rigorous demarcation between the "history of concepts" and the "history of 
words." 
A presentation of some of the research on which this paper is based, along with a 
preliminary discussion of its implications is available on Persistent Enlightenment, the 








1 This paper draws on the my earlier discussion of problems with the (now revised) entry 
“Enlightenment” in the Oxford English Dictionary (“Inventing the Enlightenment: Anti-Jacobins, 
British Hegelians, and the Oxford English Dictionary,” Journal of the History of Ideas 64:3 
(2003): 421–443) and material that previously appeared on my research blog Persistent 
Enlightenment (http://persistentenlightenment.wordpress.com).   





Oddly enough, the first English translations of the responses of Immanuel Kant and 
Moses Mendelssohn to the question “Was ist Aufklärung” did not translate the word 
Aufklärung as enlightenment. John Richardson’s 1798-1799 translation of Kant’s 
“essays and treatises” used “enlightening,” while the anonymous 1800 translation of 
Mendelssohn’s essay in the German Museum employed “enlightening the mind.” 
Something more is at stake here than the difficulty English translators faced in making 
sense of German philosophical works. These translations remind us how Aufklärung 
was used at the close of the eighteenth century:  it designated a process in which 
individuals were engaged, rather than a philosophical movement or historical period to 
which individuals might belong. It was only in the wake of Hegel’s Berlin lectures on 
the philosophy of history and the history of philosophy that “die Aufklärung” came to 
designate a discrete historical period, rather than an open-ended process.  
But the adoption of this convention in English (where, because of the emerging 
practices involving the capitalization of nouns and the use of definite articles, its 
appropriation can easily be traced) was surprisingly late:  the phrase “the 
Enlightenment” does not appear with any regularity in the corpus of English texts 





Of course, the absence of the phrase “the Enlightenment” does not necessarily 
mean that Anglophone writers lacked the concept these words designate.  But it does 
raise questions about the relationship of words and concepts and about the implications 
of recent developments in the digital humanities for historians of concepts.  This paper 
seeks to shed some light on the former by making use of some of the resources provided 
by the latter. 
 
Words and Concepts 
In the opening pages of The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (1910)— the first 
book in English to employ the term “the Enlightenment” in its title — the Princeton 
philosopher John Grier Hibben surveyed the variety of words available to designate 
what would soon come to be known as “the Enlightenment.”  Within the space of two 
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pages he referred to the object of his study as “the Enlightenment, or Aufklärung,”  the 
“philosophical century,” “the age of illumination, or enlightenment,” and “the age of 
reason.”2  Hibben may well have assumed that the menagerie of words that he 
assembled pointed to the same concept.  But, as Quentin Skinner once argued: 
 
The surest sign that a group or society has entered into the self-conscious 
possession of a new concept is that a corresponding vocabulary has been 
developed, a vocabulary that can then be used to pick out and discuss the 
concept in question with consistency.3 
 
Skinner’s claim suggests a corollary:  the lack of such a vocabulary may be 
evidence that a group or society has not yet taken “self-conscious possession” of this 
new concept.   
The translation of texts from one language into another reveals much about the 
difficulties that plague the passage of concepts from one intellectual tradition to another.  
For much of the nineteenth century, English translators appear to have had reservations 
about the German word that we now routinely translate as “enlightenment.” For 
example, in her 1841 collection of German texts, Sarah Austin translated the title of 
Kant’s essay as “What is Enlightenment?” but immediately added a footnote informing 
the reader that it was “impossible, without greater deviation from the original than I feel 
justified in making” to avoid the use of “this very awkward word, which is the exact 
translation of Aufklärung.”  She went on to suggest that a “more significant title” for the 
essay would be “A plea for the liberty of philosophizing.”4  At the close of the century, 
J. Frederick Smith opted to translate the occurrence of Aufklärung in the opening 
sentence of Kant’s essay as “Free Thought” explaining, 
 Any translation of this terminus technicus may mislead.  From Kant's 
authoritative definition of the thing, it appears that our English "Free-thinking" 
substantially represents.5  
 Others, including the English Hegelian James Hutchison Stirling, simply left 
Aufklärung untranslated.   
Stirling defended this practice on the ground that, in contrast to the English tendency to 
praise or damn isolated aspects of eighteenth-century philosophy, 
 
The Germans … have coolly turned upon it, lifted it, looked at it, and examined 
it piecemeal, till now, having at length fairly filled and satisfied themselves with 
what of instruction, negative or positive, they could extract from it, they have 
long since packed it up, and laid it on the shelf, labeled Aufklärung.6 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 John Grier Hibben, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (New York: C. Scribner’s sons, 1910) 
3-4. 
3 Quentin Skinner, “The Idea of a Cultural Lexicon,” in Regarding Method (Cambridge, UK; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 160. 
4 Sarah Austin, trans., Fragments from German Prose Writers (New York: D. Appleton and 
Company, 1841) 228. 
5 Otto Pfleiderer, The Development of Theology in Germany Since Kant, trans. by J. Frederick 
Smith (London: MacMillan & Co. 1890) 3. 
6 Stirling, “Lord Macaulay,” in Stirling, Jerrold, Tennyson, and Macaulay with Other Critical 
Essays (Edinburg: Edmonston and Douglas, 1868) 120-121. 




For all their differences, Stirling’s understanding of the relationship between 
words and concepts is not so distant from Skinner’s.  Striling would seem to be 
suggesting that, unlike the English, the Germans possess a vocabulary that allows them 
to “pick out and discuss” (or, as he would have it, “pack up” and “shelve”) the over-
arching concept that defined eighteenth-century thought. Lacking such a vocabulary, 
Anglophone writers would, he implies, be advised to take up the vocabulary that the 
Germans have provided.    
 
Before “the Enlightenment”:  Aufklärung, and Illumination, Eclaircissement 
 Perhaps the most striking instance of a nineteenth-century translator’s 
difficulties with Aufklärung involves a text that unambiguously employs the term to 
refer to the period that we know as “the Enlightenment.”  In his 1861 translation of 
Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History, John Sibree justified his peculiar choice 
of the French éclaircissement as a translation for Aufklärung this way: 
 
There is no current term in English denoting that great intellectual movement 
which dates from the first quarter of the eighteenth century, and which, if not the 
chief cause, was certainly the guiding genius of the French Revolution. The 
word “Illuminati” (signifying the members of an imaginary confederacy for 
propagating the open secret of the day), might suggest “Illumination,” as an 
equivalent for the German “Aufklärung”: but the French “Éclaircissement” 
conveys a more specific idea.7 
 
“Illumination” had, in fact, enjoyed a modest popularity during the first half of 
the nineteenth century as a translation for  Aufklärung.  It was routinely used, along with 
“mental illumination,” in German Museum (1801-1802) — a short-lived journal that 
specialized in translating eighteenth-century German texts into English.  This 
convention was later taken up in translations of German histories of philosophy and in 
discussions of German philosophical works. 
But, as Sibree noted, “Illumination” carried political connotations that he wished 
to avoid: during the 1790s, it had figured prominently in Anti-Jabobin polemics. Where 
Stirling sought to promote the use of Aufklärung as a way of facilitating a more 
philosophical account of the period, Sibree opted for a French loan-word as a way of 
avoiding the political tendencies associated with it. A comparison of Sibree’s 
alternatives, along with instances of Aufklärung in English texts, suggests that 
éclaircissement (which had some currency in early nineteenth-century literary works) 
was not entirely unfamiliar to nineteenth-century readers:  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History (London: Bohn, 1861) 456 





Over the course of the nineteenth century it would appear that the concept of 
“Enlightenment” underwent two transformations.  First, a term that, for most of the 
eighteenth century, had been used to designate a process, came to be used as a 
designation for a historical period.  Figure 1 offers compelling evidence of the delay in 
the English acquisition of a crucial part of the vocabulary needed to consolidate that 
transformation.  Figure 2 offers a hint of a second transformation that was intertwined 
with the first: a shift in the terms contested. 
 
Contesting (the) Enlightenment 
Among the misunderstandings that follow from juxtaposing “the Counter-
Enlightenment” to  “the Enlightenment” is a tendency to overlook the extent to which 
“enlightenment” remained, for longer than we sometimes realize, a contested concept.  
As Werner Schneider noted long ago, the thinkers most often recruited to fill the ranks 
of “the Counter-Enlightenment” saw themselves as defending a “true enlightenment” 
from a variety of impostors.9 Reflecting on the ambiguities inherent in invocations of 
the “counter-Enlightenment,” J. G. A. Pocock has pointed out that the term somes refers 
to “one brand of Enlightenment in opposition to another” and, at other times, to “a fixed 
antipathy to Enlightenment in some final sense of the term”10 The most important 
feature of late eighteenth-and early nineteenth-century arguments about enlightenment 
is that the contestants are far from possessing a “final sense” of what “enlightenment” 
involves. 
Because these contests are marked by a flurry of contrasting adjectives (e.g., 
wahre and falsche) and peculiar neologisms (e.g., Aufklärerei), a crude (but, perhaps, 
not misleading) way of tracing their history would be to compare the persistence of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 To avoid inflating occurrences of “the Illumination” with uses of the term in scientific or 
technical literature on urban or solar illumination, occurrences of “the Illumination of” are 
removed from the search.  The same is true for “the Enlightenment of,” which screens out a few 
cases where the term was used to refer to the process of enlightenment (e.g., “the Enlightenment of 
the understanding”), rather than the period. 
9 Werner Schneiders, Die Wahre Aufklärung: Zum Selbstverständnis der Deutschen Aufklärung 
(Freiburg,: K. Alber, 1974) 
10  J.G.A. Pocock, “Enlightenment and counter-enlightenment, revolution and counter-revolution; 
a eurosceptical enquiry,” History of Political Thought XX, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 132. 
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these pejoratives over time.  As an example, consider the following survey of usages of 





What is perhaps most immediately striking is the steady decline in usage of all 
three pejoratives between 1840 and 1880 (occurrences of these terms after 1880 are, 
more often than not, quotations from or republications of texts that date from the end of 
the eighteenth or the first half of the nineteenth centuries) and the more sudden fall in 
the usage of falsche Aufklärung.11  One possible conjecture about the reason for this 
decline would be that, by 1880, something approximating a “final sense” of the general 
characteristics of the historical period known as die Aufklärung was secured.  After that 
point, it was still possible to dispute the merits of the period, but attempts to vindicate 
the claims of the true conception of enlightenment as opposed to the false one ceased to 
be viable.  The defenders of “true enlightenment” broke off their attempt to salvage an 
alternative conception of what enlightenment might involve.  For better of worse, the 
“false enlightenment” was the only enlightenment: the particular conception of 
enlightenment that defined what now came to be seen as the most historically important 
tendencies in eighteenth-century thought had, as Stirling would have it, been deposited 
“on the shelf labeled Aufklärung.”   
There is a striking example of this process at the start of Paul Leopold Haffner’s 
Die deutsche Aufklärung, a text dating from 1864. Haffner, a Catholic clergyman would 
go on to become Archbishop of Mainz, began by feigning confusion as to what it meant 
to write a history of “enlightenment”: 
 
Enlightenment is a sublime word, if one goes back to its meaning; it means 
illumination of the spirit through truth, liberation from the shadows of error, or 
uncertainty, of doubt. Enlightenment is, in its deepest meaning, the 
transfiguration [Verklärung] of reason.12 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 What would appear to be an absence of uses of the term prior to 1790 is simply an artifact of 
Google’s scanning practices:  very few eighteenth-century books reside on open shelves in 
libraries. 
12 P. L.  Haffner,  Die deutsche Aufklärung.  Eine historische Skizze (Mainz:  Franz Kirchheim, 
1864) 1 




But he quickly dropped this pretense and conceded that he was “too much a 
child of the nineteenth century” to pursue a history that diverged so violently from 
established convention of usage. So he resigned himself to speaking the degraded 
language of his day, “which exchanges the meaning of light and darkness,” which 
produces a literature that regards “the light of Christian centuries as dark gloom,” and 
which “greets the shadows of doubt and the progress of religious barbarity as light.” It 
is obvious that Haffner rejected this enlightenment:  it was grounded in a concept of 
reason that was “purely negative, destructive, empty; it has no positive content and no 
productive principle.” But it is equally obvious that he has abandoned any illusions that 
Aufklärung might mean anything better. 
As might be expected, the discussion in English differs. While the French 
pejorative philosophisme was appropriated by English Anti-Jacobins, English critics of 
enlightenment never created a neologism that performed the same function as the 
German Aufklärerei.  As a result, the work was done adjectives such as “false” and 






A closer examination of the pattern of usage for  “false enlightenment” and 
“false Enlightenment” clarifies that pejoratives were generally associated with 
enlightenment, rather than Enlightenment: 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 To simplify matters, this Ngram is not sensitive to capitalization.  






There are few, if any, occurrences of “false Enlightenment” until the twentieth 
century.  As had been the case in the German discussion, the adjectives “true” and 
“false” refer to a process, rather than a period:  the arrival of a term designating the 
historical period in which a particular understanding of what the process known as 
“enlightenment” involved comes only after disputes about the truth or falsity of the this 
particular concept have ceased.  This parallel to German discussions should not be 
entirely surprising.  Indeed, the early appearances of “false enlightenment” are simply a 
continuation of the German discussion: the spike on the Ngram at 1835 is driven by 
editions of James Burton Robertson’s translation of Schlegel’s  Philosophy of History.14 
 
Some Implications 
What implications — substantive and methodological — might be drawn from 
this somewhat hectic survey of the vicissitudes of the concept of enlightenment over the 
course of the nineteenth century?  
First, it would appear that, as both Skinner and Stirling (that oddest of odd 
couples) suggest, words matter:  illumination, éclaircissement, enlightenment, and 
Aufklärung do not designate the same concept.  They carry different implications and 
these implications were clear to at least some of those who used them.  Indeed, an 
enhanced sensitivity to the particular nuances of words may well be a defining feature 
of periods of conceptual contestation. 
 Second, capitalization — or, more precisely, the post-1800 conventions of 
capitalization in English — also matter.  These conventions make the study of the 
emergence of the idea that there was such a thing as a discrete historical period called 
“the Enlightenment” easier to track in English than it is in German.  Conversely, they 
make the job of English translators of German texts somewhat more difficult: there is 
no reason to assume that die Aufklärung should routinely be translated as “the 
Enlightenment.” 
 Finally, the resources available for tracking occurrences of words and phrases 
has significant implications for the work of historians of concepts.  Though this attempt 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Friedrich von Schlegel, The Philosophy of History in a Course of Lectures, Delivered at Vienna, 
trans. James Burton Robertson (London: Saunders and Otley, 1835). 
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at revisiting my earlier efforts at exploring the emergence in nineteenth-century English 
texts of the concept of “the Enlightenment” offers relatively few surprises, it fills in 
some blind spots (e.g., the rationale for Sibree’s choice of éclaircissement) and turned 
up a few texts (e.g., Sarah Austin’s Kant translation) that I previously overlooked.  The 
Ngram Viewer may be a rather blunt instrument, but it will soon be supplanted by more 
elegant approaches.  And, in some cases, a blunt instrument is enough to do the work 
that needs to be done.15  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 On the virtues of the Ngram Viewer for intellectual historians, see Benjamin M. Schmidt, 
“Words Alone: Dismantling Topic Models in the Humanities,” Journal of the Digital Humanities 
2:1 (Winter 2012). 
